Lightning Fair, Inc. v. Rosenberg makes clear that an order granting or denying a motion to compel arbitration is appealed in the same way as any other final order. In addition, it states the standard by which the Alabama Supreme Court reviews a trial court's Rule 54(b) certification.
Continue Reading...In Ross v. Rosen-Rager, the Alabama Supreme Court provided guidance as to the standards by which it reviews evidentiary rulings at trial, as well as the substance of the objection that must be made at trial to preserve appellate review.
Continue Reading...In Ex parte Loma Alta Property Owners Association, Inc., No. 1081170 (Ala, June 30, 2010), the Alabama Supreme Court announced that the standard of review for an order denying a request for attorney fees under the Alabama Litigation Accountability Act is the same as the standard of review for an order granting a request for fees.
Continue Reading...In Pirtek USA, LLC v. Whitehead et al., No 1071570, the Alabama Supreme Court restated the standard of review applicable to reviewing a ruling on a motion filed pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) collaterally attacking a foreign judgment on the basis that the judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction.
Continue Reading...When circuit courts review administrative decisions, they must defer to the adminsitrative agency and set aside the agency's decision only if the decision was not supported by substantial evidence, the agency's actions were not reasonable, or the agency's actions were not within its statutory and constitutional powers. Alabama State Personnel Board v. Dueitt, 2080899 (Ala. Civ. App. May 7, 2010). In Dueitt, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed a circuit court opinion overruling an Alabama State Personnel Board decision because "the circuit court impermissibly reweighed the evidence and substituted its judgment regarding a question of fact for the judgment of the Board.".
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In Spinks v. Automation Personnel Services, Inc., No. 1081379 (Ala. April 9, 2010), the Alabama Supreme Court summarized the deferential standard of review that it uses in appeals from orders granting or denying a motion for preliminary injunction. The Court wrote, "'[T]he grant of, or refusal to grant, a preliminary injunction rests largely in the discretion of the trial court and that court's latitude in this area is considerable; if no abuse of that discretion is shown, its action will not be disturbed on appeal.' This Court has defined an abuse of discretion as discretion that 'exceed[s] the bounds of reason, all the circumstances before the lower court being considered.'"
In two of the opinions that it issued last week, the Alabama Supreme Court discussed standards of review that receive attention less frequently than others. In Intergraph Corporation et al. v. Bentley Systems Incorporated, Nos. 1080300, 1080405 (Ala. March 12, 2010), the Court described the standard of review that it applies to findings of special masters. In Archer v. The Estate of Archer, Nos. 1090093, 1090094, 1090096 (Ala. March 12, 2010), the Court outlined the standard of review that it uses when interprets a statute.
Continue Reading...Where the circuit court received only arguments on a stipulated factual record, the appeals court gave the circuit court’s judgment “no presumption of correctness,” and so reviewed that judgment under a de novo standard. Ex parte Ala. Dept. of Revenue, No. 1070925 (Ala. Feb. 26, 2010).
Continue Reading...The Alabama Supreme Court and the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals recently stated the standards of review applicable to contempt orders and orders granting permanent injunctions.
Continue Reading...In LVNV Funding, LLC v. Boyles, released last week, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment denying a motion to vacate a default judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4). The case was handled by Lightfoot, Franklin & White's own Chips Pruet and Wes Gilchrist and provides a good recent statement of the standard of review governing a ruling on a motion to vacate a default judgment.
Continue Reading...In Myers v. Harris, released September 25, 2009 by the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, the court discussed the standard of review applicable to an order dismissing an action due to the plaintiff's failure to comply with the rules governing discovery.
Continue Reading...The Alabama Supreme Court applies the de novo standard of review to constitutional challenges to state statute. The Court “approach[es] the question of the constitutionality of a legislative act ‘'with every presumption and intendment in favor of its validity, and seek to sustain rather than strike down the enactment of a coordinate branch of the government.’” The Court will sustain the legislation “’unless it is clear beyond reasonable doubt that it is violative of the fundamental law.’” 1568 Montgomery Highway, Inc. v. City of Hoover, 1070531 (Ala. Sept. 11, 2009).
"[A]ppellate courts have limited power in reviewing a judgment of a trial court after the trial court hears evidence ore tenus. 'However, where the question presented on appeal is whether the trial court correctly applied the law, the ore tenus rule has no application.'" Appellate courts review questions of law de novo, even in an ore tenus case. Holt v. Whitehurst, No. 2080131 (Ala. Civ. App. July 17, 2009).
In Holt, the trial court erred in entering a judgment for the father on the mother's attempt to change the principal residence of the parties' minor son because the trial court did not give the mother an opportunity to call witnesses at the ore tenus hearing. "Pursuant to the plain language of Rule 52 (c), the trial court could not have entered judgment against the mother until she was fully heard on the issue in question. Under the Act, the burden of proof is on the mother, as the relocating parent."
In In re Laura Kay Carlisle v. Thomas G. Moore and Atmore Animal Hospital, LLC, No, 1080038, released June 30, 2009, the Alabama Supreme Court denied the plaintiff’s petition seeking a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to enter a protective order prohibiting discovery of evidence relating to the plaintiff’s sexual history. In so doing, the court provided a glimpse into just how difficult it is to successfully mandamus a discovery order.
Continue Reading...The Eleventh Circuit applies an "extremely stringent" standard to review a new trial order based on a district court's finding that a jury verdict is against the great weight of the evidence. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Southeast Floating Docks, Inc. et al., No. 08-14133 (11th Cir. June 16, 2009). The Court explained that, "this more rigorous standard of review ensures the district court does not simply substitute its own credibility choices and inferences for the reasonable choices and inferences made by the jury." The Eleventh Circuit applies a more deferential standard when a new trial order is based on jury misconduct "or other prejudicial trial events that 'contaminate' the jury's deliberative process."
"'Where a trial court hears ore tenus testimony [in a boundary-line case], . . . its findings based upon that testimony are presumed correct, and its judgment based on those findings will be reversed only if, after a consideration of all the evidence and after making all inferences that can logically be drawn from the evidence, the judgment is found to be plainly and palpably erroneous.' Bearden v. Ellison, 560 So. 2d 1042, 1043 (Ala. 1990). The presumption of correctness accorded to the trial court's findings based on evidence presented ore tenus `is particularly strong in boundary line disputes and adverse possession cases, and the presumption is further enhanced if the trial court personally views the property in dispute. Wallace v. Putman, 495 So. 2d 1072, 1075 (Ala. 1986).' Bell v. Jackson, 530 So. 2d 42, 44 (Ala. 1988).' Shirey v. Pittman, 985 So. 2d 484, 486 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007)." Gilbreath v. Harbour, No. 2071242 (Ala. Civ. App. May 22, 2009). "However strong the ore tenus presumption in adverse-possession cases, '[t]he presumption . . . is inapplicable where the facts are undisputed and the issue is resolved simply by applying the relevant law to these undisputed facts.' Lilly v. Palmer, 495 So. 2d 522, 526 (Ala. 1986)." Id.
In affirming the jury verdict in Live v. Ventura, No. 1070736 (Ala. May 22, 2009), the Alabama Supreme Court reviewed the standard for a claim of waiver or estoppel concerning a party’s prior inconsistent position. “’Any sort of judicial estoppel or waiver in the context of a prior inconsistent argument is available only when an argument has been made by the parties involved and relied upon by the courts. See, e.g., Greene v. Jefferson County Comm'n, [Ms. 1070300, Nov. 14, 2008] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2008)(discussing judicial estoppel), and Darnall v. Hughes, [Ms. 2070349, Oct. 17, 2008] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2008)(discussing principles of equitable estoppel)’”. The Court also summarized the standard of review for a new trial following a jury verdict.
Continue Reading...In Mahoney v. Loma Alta Property Owners Assoc., No. 2080192 (Ala. Civ. App. March 27, 2009), the Court of Civil Appeals noted that although the Alabama Supreme Court has identified the standard of review for trial court awards of damages under the Alabama Litigation Accountability Act, the Court has not addressed the standard of review for appeals from orders denying a claim for ALAA damages. The Court concluded that the standard of review that applies to an appeal of an order awarding damages under the ALAA also applies to an appeal from a trial court order denying a claim for damages under the ALAA: “when the trial court denies an ALAA claim without stating its reasons, this court will reverse only when the record shows indisputably that the ‘action, claim, or defense’ is either ‘groundless in fact’ or ‘groundless in law.’” The court noted that an order denying a request for ALAA damages does not have to include findings of fact; an order granting a motion does.
Continue Reading...In Waters Brothers Contractors, Inc. v. Wimberley, No. 2070871 (Ct. Civ. App. March 6, 2009), the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals discussed the standard of review regarding causation in a worker’s compensation case. The court found that the employer’s expert’s testimony did not defeat the employee’s claim for benefits. Although the employer's expert was the only expert witness to testify regarding medical causation, the trial court was not bound to accept his testimony. “The trial court has wide discretion in reaching its findings regarding medical causation. It may interpret the evidence according to its own best judgment. A trial court may infer medical causation from circumstantial evidence indicating that, before the accident, the worker was working normal with no disabling symptoms but that, immediately afterwards, those symptoms appeared and have persisted ever since. On appeal, a trial court's findings of fact based on conflicting evidence are conclusive on this court if they are supported by substantial evidence.” Id.
Continue Reading...In Jones-Lowe Company v. Southern Land and Exploration Company, Inc., [Ms. 1071575] (Ala. March 6, 2009), the Alabama Supreme Court reversed the trial court's granting of a motion for summary judgment because the motion was based on mere averments and not supported by evidence filed with the trial court. "[M]otion averments are not evidence in any sense."
Continue Reading...In Medlock et al. v. Safeway Ins. Co., No. 1071303 (Ala. Jan. 30, 2009), the Alabama Supreme Court reviewed de novo the judgment that the trial court entered in a declaratory judgment action before the plaintiff insurance company filed a motion for summary judgment. The Alabama Supreme Court treated the sua sponte judgment as a Rule 12(c) judgment on the pleadings because the trial court relied only on the pleadings and on the insurance policy attached to the complaint, which was incorporated into the complaint by reference without objection from the defendants. Three justices dissented. They would have dismissed the appeal based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction because they believed that there was no justiciable controversy between the plaintiff insurance company and the defendant insureds.
The Alabama Supreme Court followed the lead of the United States Supreme Court and held that, for cases decided under the Federal Arbitration Act, manifest disregard for the law is not a valid basis on which to challenge the arbitration award. In Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 1396 (2008), the United States Supreme Court held that the only bases on which an arbitration award can be challenged were the bases set out in 9 U.S.C. 10(a) and, because "manifest disregard of the law" was not one of those grounds listed, it cannot serve as a ground upon which the award could be reversed. In Hereford v. D.R. Horton, Inc., [Ms. 1070396] (Ala. Jan. 9, 2009), the Alabama Supreme Court followed suit. The Alabama Supreme Court overruled its prior, inconsistent caselaw and held that, consistent with the United States Supreme Court holding, "manifest disregard for the law" is not a proper ground by which an arbitration award can be challnged where the arbitration was held pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act.
In Henriksen v. Roth, No. 1060875 (Ala. Dec. 31, 2008), the Alabama Supreme Court left for another day the question of the proper standard of review for issues regarding judicial estoppel. "Henriksen urges this Court to apply a de novo standard of review regarding the trial court's refusal to grant her judicial-estoppel motion, arguing that the issue is purely a question of law. The Roth defendants urge this Court to employ an abuse-of-discretion standard of review, noting that Alabama law provides trial courts with considerable discretion concerning equitable remedies and observing that the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviews such rulings applying that same standard. See Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. Institute of London Underwriters, 430 F.3d 1326, 1331 (11th Cir. 2005)." The Court did not decide the proper standard of review, "because the result is the same regardless of the standard applied."
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In this appeal from a Fair Dismissal Act proceeding in which employees of Bishop State Community College challenged their terminations on procedural grounds, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals reviewed de novo the decision of the hearing officers in the administrative proceeding. The Court explained that it applied the de novo standard because the question that it considered was whether the officers "erred in rescinding the employees' terminations on the ground that Bishop State had failed to provide the employees proper notice of the factual bases for the termination of their employment and their pay. In resolving that question, we review only the hearing officers' conclusions of law and their application of law to the facts. As such, our standard of review is de novo. Barngrover v. Medical Licensure Comm'n of Alabama, 852 So. 2d 147, 152 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002) (stating that the presumption of correctness typically afforded a hearing officer's decision in an administrative proceeding does not attach to the hearing officer's conclusions of law or to his or her improper application of the law to the facts)." Bishop State Community College v. Angelo Archible, No. 2070670 (Ala. Civ. App. October 24, 2008).
The Alabama Supreme Court reviews motion for summary judgment de novo; however, when the Court considers whether evidence offered in support of or in opposition to a summary judgment motion will be admissible at trial so that the court may consider it at the summary judgment stage, the Alabama Supreme Court applies the abuse of discretion standard to these evidentiary rulings. Van Voorst v. Federal Express Corp., No. 105077 (Ala. October 3, 2008).
Continue Reading...In Baldwin v. Panetta, released September 19, 2008, the Court of Civil Appeals discussed the ore tenus standard of review.
Continue Reading...In Beauchamp v. Coastal Boat Storage, LLC et al., No. 1061515 (Ala. Sept. 5, 2008), the Supreme Court held that when a plaintiff asserts as the sole ground for a motion for new trial that the verdict is against the great weight or preponderance of the evidence, a trial court order granting the motion for new trial, “’will be reversed for abuse of discretion where on review it is easily perceivable from the record that the jury verdict is supported by the evidence.’" Id. at *14 (quoting Jawad v. Granade, 497 So. 2d 571, 477 (Ala. 1986)). This is so even when the trial court does not state the basis for its order granting the motion for new trial, and there are errors in the trial record that warrant a new trial.
Continue Reading...“’The proper method of reviewing circuit court decisions involving appeals from the Jefferson County Personnel Board is by common-law petition for writ of certiorari.’ Ex parte Personnel Board of Jefferson County, 513 1029, 1031 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987). ‘Review of the writ of certiorari in this court is limited to consideration of the proper application of the law by the circuit court and whether that court’s decision is supported by the legal evidence.’ Copeland v. Personnel Board of Jefferson County, 498 So. 2d 854, 855 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986).’” Ex parte City of Birmingham, No. 2070068 (Ala. Civ. App. April 18, 2008).
In Roberts v. Uni. of Alabama Hospital, No. 2070256 (Ala. Civ. App. April 18, 2008), a hospital lien action, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals held that, “[a]ppellate courts properly apply a presumption of correctness to factual determinations of trial courts, even in the context of mixed questions of law and fact.”
Massey Chevrolet, Inc. v. Aderhold, released on April 4 by the Court of Civil Appeals, indicates the consequences of the trial court's failure to comply with section 25-5-88 in a workers' compensation case.
Continue Reading...Ex parte Safeway Ins. Co. of Alabama, Inc., No. 1061613 provides an interesting discussion regarding mandamus review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss based on subject matter jurisdiction.
Continue Reading...In a routine case, when the trial court hears the evidence ore tenus, an appellate court presumes that the trial court’s findings based upon that testimony are correct. When the dispute at issue is a boundary line dispute or a case concerning adverse possession, the presumption of correctness is enhanced, particularly “if the trial court personally views the property in dispute.” Shirey v. Pitman, No. 2060574 (Ala. Civ. App. Nov. 30, 2007).
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