Alabama Appellate Watch

The Court used two lesser known standards of review in the opinions that it issued last week.  In Ex parte Johnson, No. 1061762 (Ala. May 16, 2008), the Court discussed the standard of review applicable to a petition for a writ of prohibition. In The Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Tuscaloosa County et al., No. 1060496 (Ala. May 16, 2008), the Court considered the standard of review that governs a motion to dismiss a declaratory judgment action. Although the Court ultimately decided to issue a writ of mandamus rather than a writ of prohibition in Ex parte Johnson, the Court explained that the standard of review that applies to a petition for a writ of prohibition is very similar to the standard that the Court employs to review a mandamus petition. The Court will not issue a writ of prohibition unless “there is no other adequate remedy.” A writ of prohibition “’is proper for the prevention of a usurpation or abuse of power where a court undertakes to act in a manner in which it does not properly have jurisdiction.’ Ex parte K.S.G., 645 So.2d at 299.'” Id. (quoting Ex parte Sealy, L.L.C., 904 So. 2d 1230, 1232-33 (Ala. 2004)).

The Court quoted at length from its opinion in Waite v. Waite, 959 So. 2d 610, 614 (Ala. 2006), in the declaratory judgment appeal:

‘On appeal, a dismissal is not entitled to a presumption of correctness. The appropriate standard of review . . . is whether, when the allegations of the complaint are viewed most strongly in the pleader's favor, it appears that the pleader could prove any set of circumstances that would entitle [him] to relief. In making this determination, this Court does not consider whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but only whether [he] may possibly prevail. We note that a . . . dismissal is proper only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.’

‘Jacks v. Madison County, 741 So. 2d 429, 430 (Ala.Civ.App.1999) (citations omitted). In addition, `[m]otions to dismiss are rarely appropriate in declaratory judgment proceedings. Such a motion does, however, serve one purpose, that of determining whether the [complaint] states the substance of a bonafide justiciable controversy which should be settled.' Wallace v. Burleson, 361 So.2d 554, 555 (Ala.1978) (citation omitted).’

City of Tuscaloosa, supra.