Alabama Appellate Watch : Blog Published by Lightfoot Franklin & White : Alabama Litigation Lawyer & Attorney : Appellate, Alabama Supreme Court (Supreme Court of Alabama)

The plaintiffs won a multi-claim jury verdict. The defendant had sought a JML at all proper times in the circuit court; and, when that court denied its final, post-judgment JML motion, the defendant appealed.

The plaintiffs largely ignored the defendant’s appellate arguments. Instead, they argued that the defendant had “failed to preserve for review virtually all the issues it raise[d] on appeal because” the defendant had not “object[ed] to the trial court’s jury instructions on the disputed claims.”

The Alabama Supreme Court saw misunderstanding and confusion in the plaintiffs’ analysis. The defendant was not challenging the accuracy of the trial court’s instructions. Rather, it was arguing that there was not enough proof to submit the plaintiffs’ claims to the jury. These are different arguments, motions for JML being governed by procedural Rule 50, objections to jury charges by Rule 51.

To preserve its JML argument challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the defendant was required to: 1) seek a JML at the close of all evidence, specifying lack of proof as a ground; and 2) renew this motion post-judgment, again specifying a lack of proof. The defendant had done both things, and its JML issues were thus preserved for appeal.

The plaintiffs offered a reply which may be worth discussing. The trial court, said the plaintiffs, had used a “fairly unique procedure” by addressing the defendant’s JML motion “only during the charge conference when it considered the parties’ requested jury charges.” In this context, the plaintiffs urged, the defendant was required to object to the jury charges in order to preserve its JML motion.

The Alabama Supreme Court disagreed. First, as a matter of fact, the plaintiffs had not accurately depicted the trial court’s actions. The lower court had simply denied the defendant’s JML motion and then went on to the charge conference to enumerate which claims remained in the case. Moreover — and this is perhaps the more interesting part — even if the trial court had used the charge conference to address the JML motion, this would not have added “an extra requirement to the two requirements” (listed above) for preserving a lack-of-proof JML motion. The defendant had moved for a JML at the close of all evidence, and again in a timely post-judgment filing, in both motions specifically urging a lack of proof. This was all that was needed, and the defendants had thereby preserved its arguments for appeal.

In Bailey, the plaintiffs contested their grandmother's will, alleging that their uncle had unduly influenced their grandmother to change her will in his favor.  Following the jury's verdict in favor of the uncle, the plaintiffs moved for a new trial, arguing that the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that a radical change from the bequests of previous wills raises the inference that a subsequent will was the product of influence. The court agreed, stating that in a jury case, a party is entitled to have its case tried to a jury that is given the appropriate standard by which to reach its decision, and a wrongful refusal of a requested jury charge constitutes a ground for a new trial.  Pursuant to Rule 45 of the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure, however, refusal of a special charge may only result in a new trial where "it should appear that the error complained of has probably injuriously affected substantial rights of the parties." 

The court found that that standard was met.  The instruction the plaintiffs sought regarding the inference of undue influence was a correct statement of the law.  The remaining jury instructions that were given at trial did not address the inference of undue influence resulting from a radical deviation from the bequests of previous wills. Because the jury might have reached a different conclusion if it had been properly instructed, the failure to give the charge prejudiced the plaintiffs and a new trial was warranted.