Alabama Litigation Lawyer & Attorney : Lightfoot Franklin & White : Appellate, Alabama Supreme Court (Supreme Court of Alabama)

The default judgment was entered in this divorce proceeding after the husband's counsel withdrew and the husband missed the final hearing.  However, the husband moved to set aside the default on the basis that he missed the hearing due to his hospitalization for observation due to suicidal impulses and threats.  The trial court denied the motion to set aside, and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed.  The court noted that cases should be heard on the merits whenever practicable, and this is especially true domestic relations cases.

Also, it is worth noting that the motion to set aside was styled as a Rule 55(c) motion.  The motion was filed 31 days after the entry of default.  This is untimely, as Rule 55 motions must be filed within 30 days.  However, Rule 60(b)(1) allows relief in some instances more than 30 days after the entry.  It is not clear from the opinion when the motion was converted to a Rule 60 motion, or if the court did so sua sponte.  But, the court considered the motion even though it was a Rule 55 motion filed more than 30 days after the entry of default. 

The parties below were embroiled in the discovery stages of a workers' compensation action.  During the course of discovery, the petitioner requested that the respondent produce a certain videotape.  The respondent objected. At a status conference, the trial court ordered that the respondent would be allowed to take the petitioner's deposition before it was required to produce the videotape.  Subsequently, the petitioner filed a "motion to vacate or modify" the trial court's order.  The trial court denied the motion on May 15, 2007. The petitioner filed her petition for a writ of mandamus on June 20, 2007. 

The court held that it had no appellate jurisdiction.  The petition was filed 68 days after the trial court entered the order allowing the respondent to depose the petitioner. The motion to alter or vacate did not work to extend the presumptively reasonable time within which the petitioner could have filed her petition for writ of mandamus.  The court pointed out that "unlike a postjudgment motion following a final judgment, a motion to reconsider an interlocutory order does not toll the presumptively reasonable time period that a party has to petition an appellate court for a writ of mandamus."

Although a mandamus petition not filed within the presumptively reasonable time period may be considered if accompanied by a statement of the circumstances constituting good cause for the untimeliness, the petitioner did not include such a statement.  Accordingly, it was dismissed.