Alabama Appellate Watch : Blog Published by Lightfoot Franklin & White : Alabama Litigation Lawyer & Attorney : Appellate, Alabama Supreme Court (Supreme Court of Alabama)

The homeowner hired a worker to install carpet and tile in her home. When she did not pay the balance due, the worker sued her in district court. The homeowner counterclaimed for an amount over the district court’s jurisdictional ceiling, and the case was transferred to circuit court. The circuit judge ruled for the worker on all claims.

The homeowner then filed an appeal. In fact, she filed two notices of appeal. On the day her notice was due, February 19, she filed a self-drafted “notice of appeal” in the district court. This notice was not on the Form ARAP-1 that appears in Appendix I to the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure.

One week later — on February 26, and thus after the time for appealing had passed — the homeowner filed a notice of appeal that “resemble[d]” Form ARAP -1. This document she filed in the circuit court.

The Court of Civil Appeals held that the homeowner had effected a timely appeal. Though not on Form ARAP-1, her initial notice contained all the information that the law requires in such a notice. Rule 3(c) of the appellate rules provides that a notice of appeal “shall specify the party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment, order or part thereof appealed from; and shall name the court to which the appeal is taken.” The February 19 notice included all of these items. Nor was that notice hobbled by being filed in the district court, “because the clerk of the circuit court with whom the notice . . . should have been filed is also the clerk of the district court.”

The court concluded that the homeowner had filed a timely appeal, and went on to address the merits of the case.

The defendant timely appealed from the circuit court’s denial of post-conviction relief. His notice of appeal was signed by a New York lawyer who had been admitted pro hac vice for the case. The State convinced the Court of Criminal Appeals that, in fact, the out-of-state lawyer had not been so admitted; and, on this ground, the appeal was dismissed.

The Supreme Court of Alabama took the case on certiorari and reversed the dismissal, holding that the intermediate court should have entertained the case. In so holding, the state’s high court reviewed some important points about notices of appeal — their required content and their efficacy even when “technically deficient.”

The court first noted that the New York lawyer, by all appearances, had been admitted pro hac vice. The contrary finding by the Court of Criminal Appeals “appear[ed] to be incorrect.”

More important, or at least more interesting, the Supreme Court of Alabama also held that the notice would have been effective, and the dismissal erroneous, even if the New York lawyer had not been admitted. The court reasoned that the notice of appeal was timely. Moreover, it satisfied Ala. R. App. P. 3, which requires that a notice do three things: 1) specify the party or parties taking the appeal; 2) identify the order(s) appealed from; and 3) name the court to which appeal is made. Even if the notice had not contained these things, though, it still would have been effective, and the appeal still could not have been dismissed. The court wrote: “A notice of appeal, even if technically deficient, is valid if ‘the intention to appeal from a specific judgment may be reasonably inferred from the text of the notice.’” “The defect on [this defendant’s] notice — a signature of an attorney purportedly not admitted to practice in Alabama — is not grounds for dismissal because a signature is not a jurisdictional requirement for a notice of appeal.”

The court then reviewed cases in which technically deficient notices were held to have effectively lodged appeals. The “only jurisdictional requirement for a notice of appeal,” the court recited, “is that the notice be timely filed.” As for other defects, “absent a showing that the alleged defect . . . prejudiced the adverse party, an appeal will not be dismissed on the basis of the defect.”

In McGough, the plaintiffs brought an action under the Dram Shop Act seeking to recover from G&A, Inc., d/b/a the Cajun Grille, and others for the death of their son.  When the trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, two other motions remained pending: a motion for contempt and a motion to award attorneys' fees pursuant to the Alabama Litigation Accountability Act ("the ALAA").  

In considering its appellate jurisdiction, the court noted the general rule that a judgment is only final if it disposes of all the claims pending in the trial court.  Both motions pending at the time the summary judgment was entered in this case, however, fell under an exception to the general rule.  The pendency of a contempt motion does not render a judgment nonfinal.  In addition, the failure of a trial court to specifically reserve jurisdiction over an ALAA claim in a summary-judgment order impliedly disposes of that claim.  Therefore, the summary judgment appealed from was final even though two claims remained pending in the trial court.

The court next considered an irregularity in the appellants' notice of appeal.  Although Cajun Grille, L.L.C. was voluntarily dismissed at the trial court level, the notice of appeal named "Cajun Grille, L.L.C. et al." as the appellees.  The summary judgment from which the appeal was taken was entered in favor of the remaining appellees, none of whom were specifically named in the notice of appeal.  The notice of appeal, however, did specify that the appeal was taken from the only summary judgment entered in the case.  In addition, it was served upon the attorney for all of the remaining defendants. 

The court concluded that the irregularities in the notice of appeal did not amount to a significant defect that rendered the appeal a nullity.  Although dicta in several of the cases cited suggested that a notice of appeal from a judgment in favor of two or more parties must specifically name each party whose judgment the appellant wishes to overturn, at least two supreme court cases have clarified that no specific designation of every appellee is necessary so long as the appellant specifies the judgment from which he or she is appealing.  In addition, the supreme court has further held that the failure to designate a prevailing defendant as an appellee would be excused when the notice specified the judgment appealed from and appellant's counsel properly served the notice of appeal on counsel for the unnamed appellee.  

Following this logic, the court held that the irregularities did not amount to a significant defect.  The appellants specified the judgment from which they were appealing and properly served counsel representing all the named defendants.  In addition, a brief was filed on behalf of all the appellees. Thus, the technical error did not prejudice the appellees in any substantive manner and the merits of the appeal could be considered.