Alabama Appellate Watch : Blog Published by Lightfoot Franklin & White : Alabama Litigation Lawyer & Attorney : Appellate, Alabama Supreme Court (Supreme Court of Alabama)

In this divorce case, the wife filed a rule 60(b)(4) motion arguing that the judgment was void because, although the trial court judge rendered the order prior to leaving office, the clerk did not actually enter the judgment until after the judge's term ended.  The Court of Civil Appeals concluded that an order is valid where the trial court judge both renders judgment and directs entry of the judgment prior to leaving office.  In this scenario, the entry of judgment is merely a ministerial act and the order is valid.  Here, the trial court judge signed the order and filed it in the clerk's office prior to leaving office, so the order was valid.

The Court of Civil Appeals distinguished this case from the situation where the trial court merely signed the order prior to leaving office but took no steps to direct entry.  Citing Rollins v. Rollins, 903 So. 2d 828 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004), the Court of Civil Appeals noted that until the trial court delivers the judgment to the clerk and directs entry of judgment, the judgment is subject to change and not final.  The trial court must take both steps - rendering and directing entry - for the order to be valid.

The wife also argued that the order was not valid because it was filed with the clerk on a legal holiday.  The Court of Civil Appeals noted that Ala. R. Civ. P. 77(c) sets out when the courts must be open.  It does not, however, say when the courts can't  be open.  Rule 77(a) says that the courts are always open for the purpose of filing a pleading and, therefore, the order was valid even if filed on a legal holiday.

Finally, the wife argued that the trial court (i.e. the judge who took over for the trial judge who made order prior to leaving office) erred by allowing her Rule 59 post-judgment motions to be denied by operation of law without affording her a hearing when a hearing was requested.  The Court of Civil Appeals held that a party is entitled to a hearing on a post-judgment motion when a hearing is requested, but failure to have a hearing is harmless error if the motions have no merit.  Here, the Court of Civil Appeals concluded that the motions had some merit.  Therefore, the Court of Civil Appeals remanded the case to the trial court to hold hearings on the Rule 59 motions. 

Vulcan filed a motion for remittitur of a punitive damages award.  The plaintiff served extensive post judgment discovery to Vulcan.  The trial court compelled production of the information, and Vulcan sought mandamus relief.  The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Woodall, took this opportunity to clarify the scope of permissible post-judgment discovery.

First. the Court addressed the scope of discovery of a defendant's financial information.  Vulcan did not assert inability to pay the award as a basis for remittitur, but the plaintiff argued that Vulcan's financial information was relevant to review the "relationship between the defendant's financial position and the size of the punitive-damages award" and the profit from the misconduct.  Slip Op., p. 12.  The Court held that discovery into Vulcan's financial status was not relevant to the punitive damage review this case.

The Court first noted that a plaintiff cannot seek additur of punitive damages or seek a hearing on the adequacy of damages.  Slip Op., p. 13.  Instead, the Hammond/Green Oil factors are considered for the benefit of the defendants, and that, therefore, the defendant can waive reliance on certain factors.  Slip Op., p. 14.  The Court held that because Vulcan conceded that its financial condition did not warrant a reduction, information about Vulcan's finances was not relevant.  Indeed, Vulcan's disclaimer required the trial court to weigh the relationship factor against remittitur.  Slip Op., p. 16. 

With regard to the profitability factor, the Court noted that, to be relevant, the profit at issue had to be from the alleged conduct at issue in the suit.  The Court held that "[e]vidence of Vulcan's general financial status is far too attenuated for useful analysis under the profitability factor."  Slip. Op., p. 17.

The Court addressed sveeral other areas of post-judgment discovery as well.  For example, the Plaintiff sought discovery of Vulcan's knowledge of "other lawsuits" and "other quarries."  Citing the United States Supreme Court case State Farm v. Campbell, the Court held that discovery should be geographically limited to Alabama because an Alabama court cannot punish for conduct which occurred out of state.  Slip Op., pp. 19-20.  Likewise, the request must be temporally limited to a period of 5 years.  Slip Op., pp. 21-22.  Moroever, the request regarding other litigation must be limited to similar litigation.  Slip. Op.. pp. 24-25.

The minutes of the Board of Directors' meeting were not discoverable where the minutes made no mention of the plaintiff.  Slip Op. pp. 27-28.  And, discovery of Vulcan's attorney's fees would not be discoverable unless Vulcan challenged the reasonableness of the plaintiff's fees as part of the review of the costs of litigation.  Slip Op.. pp. 34-36.

Finally, the Court denied the petition with regard to the production of Vulcan's e-mails about the case, but, remanded the issue to the trial court for a review of whether the e-mails were privileged.

Also of note in this case are the concurrences written by Justice Murdock and Chief Justice Cobb.

Justice Murdock concurred because he believed enough financial information had already been produced the the Plaintiff and that the requested information was not needed.  However, he disagreed with the Court's conclusion that Vulcan's financial condition was not relevant.  In support of his argument, Justice Murdock raised two main points, but both points appear to be inconsistent with Alabama law.

First, Justice Murdock  wrote "Essential to the trial court's determination of the proper amount of the punitive damages award is a determination that the presumption in favor of the award made by the jury has been rebutted."  Slip op.,  42.  However, both the trial court's and Supreme Court's review of punitive damages is de novo, so there is no presumption of correctness.  Ala. Code 6-11-23(a);  Horton Homes, Inc. v. Brooks, 832 So.2d 44, 57 (Ala. 2001); Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 121 S.Ct. 1678 (2001).

Second, Justice Murdock argues that the financial condition is relevant because it "might support the award, or at least some award greater than that which the trial court otherwise would choose" and that I find no indication in our cases -- before today's decision -- that, where the task of the trial court is to decide what amount of punitive damages will be 'proper,' the financial condition of the defendant is not admissible both for the purpose of assessing that level of damages might be too much and for the purpose of assessing what reduced level of damages might not be enough."  Slip Op., pp. 43-44.  However, Alabama cases hold that an excessive punitive aard cannnot be upheld simply because a defendant has the authority to pay.  BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 701 So.2d 507, 514 (Ala. 1997);   American Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 704 So. 2d 1361, 1366 (Ala. 1997).

Chief Justice Cobb had similar concerns.  Chief Justice Cobb wrote that the Hammond/Green Oil factors were designed to benefit the defendant "insofar as the 'benefit' in question is the defendant's right to a fair punishment, . . . and not the defendant's interest in avoiding punishment." Slip Op., pp. 52-35 (internal citations omitted, emphasis in original).  Chief Justice Cobb stressed that a defendant could not avoid the effect of a Hammond/Green Oil factor simply by disclaiming reliance on it.

Following lengthy trial proceedings and several interlocutory appeals, the proceedings in this case culminated in a final judgment on April 4, 2006.  On May 5, 2006, the defendants filed a petition for the award of attorney fees, costs, and expenses.  On June 2, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a motion to strike the petition.  On September 22, 2006, the trial court found that the claims raised by the plaintiffs were frivolous and awarded attorneys fees and costs to the defendants.  

On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in awarding fees and expenses because the petition seeking them was untimely.  The officers asserted that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54, the fee request was required to have been filed within 14 days of the entry of the judgment.  Alternatively, they argued that, pursuant to Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure 59, it was to have been filed within 30 days of the date of the judgment. 

Although neither the FRCP Rule 54 nor the ARCP Rule 59 issue was argued before the trial court, the Rule 59 issue was considered because the plaintiffs argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition because it was untimely pursuant to Rule 59. 

The court disagreed, however, noting that the assessment of costs is merely incidental to the judgment and may be done at any time prior to issuance of execution.  Therefore, the petition, insofar as it related to costs, was not subject to the 30-day time requirement set forth in Rule 59(e).  Similarly, the US Supreme Court has held that a request for an award of attorney fees pursuant to civil rights statutes is not a motion to alter or amend the judgment.  Accordingly, the petition was not required to have been filed within 30 days.