Alabama Appellate Watch : Alabama Litigation Lawyer & Attorney : Lightfoot Franklin & White : Appellate, Alabama Supreme Court (Supreme Court of Alabama)

In this divorce case, the wife filed a rule 60(b)(4) motion arguing that the judgment was void because, although the trial court judge rendered the order prior to leaving office, the clerk did not actually enter the judgment until after the judge's term ended.  The Court of Civil Appeals concluded that an order is valid where the trial court judge both renders judgment and directs entry of the judgment prior to leaving office.  In this scenario, the entry of judgment is merely a ministerial act and the order is valid.  Here, the trial court judge signed the order and filed it in the clerk's office prior to leaving office, so the order was valid.

The Court of Civil Appeals distinguished this case from the situation where the trial court merely signed the order prior to leaving office but took no steps to direct entry.  Citing Rollins v. Rollins, 903 So. 2d 828 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004), the Court of Civil Appeals noted that until the trial court delivers the judgment to the clerk and directs entry of judgment, the judgment is subject to change and not final.  The trial court must take both steps - rendering and directing entry - for the order to be valid.

The wife also argued that the order was not valid because it was filed with the clerk on a legal holiday.  The Court of Civil Appeals noted that Ala. R. Civ. P. 77(c) sets out when the courts must be open.  It does not, however, say when the courts can't  be open.  Rule 77(a) says that the courts are always open for the purpose of filing a pleading and, therefore, the order was valid even if filed on a legal holiday.

Finally, the wife argued that the trial court (i.e. the judge who took over for the trial judge who made order prior to leaving office) erred by allowing her Rule 59 post-judgment motions to be denied by operation of law without affording her a hearing when a hearing was requested.  The Court of Civil Appeals held that a party is entitled to a hearing on a post-judgment motion when a hearing is requested, but failure to have a hearing is harmless error if the motions have no merit.  Here, the Court of Civil Appeals concluded that the motions had some merit.  Therefore, the Court of Civil Appeals remanded the case to the trial court to hold hearings on the Rule 59 motions. 

Following Horton Homes, Inc. v. Shaner, [Ms. 10616589] (Ala. June 20, 2008) and Jenks v. Harris, 990 So. 2d 787 (Ala. 2008), the Alabama Supreme Court dismissed an appeal of an arbitration award because the Circuit Court Clerk had not entered the arbitration award at issue as a judgment - a necessary prerequisite of judicial review of an arbitration award.  The Supreme Court remanded the case so that the judgment could be entered and the review process commenced in the trial court.

In dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court rejected two other bases on which it was argued the Court had jurisdiction even though no judgment was entered in the trial court.  First, the appellants argued that that entry of the judgment was not necessary because the case was originally filed in the Circuit Court and had been stayed pending the arbitration.  The appellants argued that the entry of the arbitration judgment is to give the trial court jurisdiction and, because the trial court already had jurisdiction, the entry of the arbitration judgment was superfluous.  The Court rejected this argument, noting that the exact same scenario was present in Jenks, and the Court dismissed the appeal in that case as well.

Second, the appellant argued that entry was not necessary because the motion to vacate was made pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 USC sec 9.  Section 9 first states that the parties in the arbitration agreement may specificy the court in which the judgment is to be entered, and the trial court has jurisdiction to review that award. The arbitration agreement in this case, however, did not specify the court in which judgment is to be entered, so the terms of 9 USC sec 9 were not met.

Section 9 of the FAA  goes on to state that if no court is specified, then the party may seek confirmation or review of the awrad "to the United States court in and for the district in which  such award was made."  The Court noted that the application for review was made in the state courtcuit court, not the federal district court.  Thus, this provision did not provide for jurisdcition without entry of judgment.

The circuit court awarded an employee workers’ compensation benefits. The employer challenged this decision by post-judgment motion, filing a “Motion for New Trial Pursuant to Rule 50 and/or Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60.” The circuit court denied these motions on May 24. The next day, the circuit court purported to set aside this order, and scheduled the employer’s motions for a hearing. After that hearing, the circuit court again denied the employer’s motions. This was on June 21; 42 days later, the employer appealed from the June 21 order.

The Court of Civil Appeals, acting on its own motion, dismissed the appeal as untimely. The circuit court lacked authority to reconsider its initial denial of the Rule 59 and 60 motions. Once it denied those motions (on May 24), it lost jurisdiction of the case; the time to appeal then began to run. In the appellate court’s words:

[A] trial court does not have jurisdiction to entertain a motion to reconsider the denial of a Rule 60(b) . . . motion. . . . Similarly, after a trial court denies a Rule 59 post-judgment motion, the trial court no longer has jurisdiction over the case and the aggrieved party’s only remedy is to appeal.

(Quotation omitted).

A timely appeal thus must have come within 42 days of the May 24th denial — that is, by July 5. Because the employer did not appeal until August 2 (which was 42 days after the ineffective second denial), its appeal was late and was consequently dismissed.

(The Court of Civil Appeals made two subsidiary points along the way, which may be of interest. First, the court reminded readers that amended Rule 58(c) — which deems judgments “entered” on the “actual date” on which they are “input” to the State Judicial Information System — applies retroactively. Rule 58(c) was amended effective September 16, 2006, “but has been held to apply retroactively to all cases pending” on that date, “including cases ‘pending’ in an appellate court.”