Alabama Litigation Lawyer & Attorney : Lightfoot Franklin & White : Appellate, Alabama Supreme Court (Supreme Court of Alabama)

In Peebles, the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that a zoning ordinance was valid.  The plaintiffs filed Rule 59 postjudgment motions, and requested a hearing on the motions.  Before the hearing was held, however, the trial court denied the motions.  On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred by failing to hold the requested hearing on the motions.  The Supreme Court, however, held that even though it was error not to hold the hearing, the error was not reversible.

The Court noted that Ala. R. Civ. P. 59(g) provides that post-judgment motions "shall not be ruled upon until the parties have had opportunity to be heard thereon."  However, "although the trial court may have erred by not holding a hearing on the Peeble's group postjudgment  motion, such an error does not automatically necessitate a reversal."  p. 11.  Instead, the error will be harmless where "(1) there is . . . no probable merit in the grounds asserted in the motionm or (2) the appellate court resolves the issues presented therein, as a matter of law, adversely to the movant, by application of the same objective standard of review as that applied in the trial court."  p. 11, quoting Historic Blakely Authority v. Williams, 675 So. 2d 359, 352 (Ala. 1995).  Here, because the Court decided the issue as a matter of law using the same standard of review as the trial court, any error was harmless and thus not reversable.

The Court also touched on two other interesting issues.  First, the Peebles argued that the trial court erred by dismissing one of the defendants.  However, the plaintiffs failed to cite legal authority for its argument.  The Court restated the rule that "[w]here am appellant fails to cite any authority for an argument, this Court may affirm the judgment as to those issues, for it is neither this Court's duty nor its function to perform all the legal research for an appellant,"  p. 8, and affirmed the dismissal.

Second, the Court touched on, but did not decide, whether a reply brief filed by a summary judgment movant the day before a hearing was timely.  Ala. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2) requires that "the motion for summary judgment, with all supporting materials, including any briefs, shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time fixed for the hearing . . ."  The Court did not decide if the trial court erred by holding the hearing one day after the filing of the reply brief, instead concluding that the error, if any, was harmless.  The Court noted that the reply brief did not contain any new evidence or arguments and, therefore, there was no prejudice.   

The taxpayer for several years intentionally listed fictitious assets on its tax returns, and paid the attendant tax. The taxpayer later amended its returns and sought a refund for the amounts it had overpaid as a result of claiming the fictitious property. The tax assessor, and then the Probate Court, both denied the refund. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed this denial. The latter court held that Ala. Code § 40-10-160, providing for refunds based upon “mistake” or “error,” did not authorize refunds where overpayment resulted from the taxpayer’s intentionally false statements. The taxpayer then sought certiorari review in the Supreme Court of Alabama.

The state’s high court upheld the denials. Before it, the court said, was an issue of first impression:

whether the term ‘error’ has a meaning different from the term ‘mistake,’ [and] specifically whether the former term is broad enough to encompass intentional dishonest conduct . . . .

The taxpayer insisted that the word “error” could embrace intentional dishonesty, and that refunds could thus be given for such “errors.” The Supreme Court of Alabama disagreed. It reviewed how the words “error” and “mistake” had been used in Alabama law dating from 1873. While recognizing that “parsed” and “nuanced definitions” could be given, it agreed with the Court of Civil Appeals that, “an intentional misrepresentation is not included in the plain meaning of either word.” “The settled meaning of the terms ‘error’ and ‘mistake,’” the court wrote, “is not consistent with intentional dishonest acts.”

The court also “noted”—in a passage that is almost certainly dicta—that rules of construction did not require the words to be given discrete meanings. Statutes occasionally use synonymous terms “for clarity or emphasis,” the court explained, a drafting choice that “is clearly within the prerogative of the Legislature.”

Finally, in another question of first impression — though one of narrower application, and so perhaps of less general interest — the court held that the taxing authority had the right to assess taxes on the property listed on the taxpayer’s returns, even though those assets did not in truth exist. This discussion centered on notions of equity. The taxpayer essentially “requested the probate court to invoke its equity jurisdiction to grant the refund petitions.” But the taxpayer had not come to equity with clean hands. Equity thus did not compel the taxing authority to give a refund. Indeed, authority cited by the court argued that the taxing authority “not only may, but should, assert equitable defenses to deny refunds of taxes paid on fraudulently inflated” assets.