Final Judgment Rule Results in Dismissal of Two Cases
The Court of Civil Appeals dismissed two appeals last week, J. Bryant, LLC v. City of Birmingham, No. 20704553, and Morgungenko v. Dwayne's Body Shop, No. 2071080. The court held that neither appeal was from a final judgment.
In the Bryant case, the part owner of an adult-entertainment establishment ("Lynn's Den") appealed from the circuit court's order reviewing the city council's denial of his dance permit. That order determined that Lynn's Den had failed to establish that the denial was arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious, but failed to address constitutional claims Lynn's Den raised. On appeal, Lynn's Den sought to argue that it had a constitutionally protected property right in using its property as an adult-entertainment establishment because that use was a legal nonconforming use under the City's zoning regulations.
However, the trial court's judgment addressed only whether the city council's denial of the dance permit was arbitrary or capricious and did not address the constitutional claim. Because there was more remaining to be done in the trial court, the judgment was not final within the final judgment rule and would not support an appeal.
A less straightforward application of the final judgment rule was seen with the same result in the Morgungenko case. There, Dwayne's Body Shop had sought to sell the Morgungenko's vehicle purusant to the Abandoned Motor Vehicle Act in order to recover storage fees and the costs of certain repairs it had performed o the vehicle. The Morgungenkos objected, arguing that they were owners of the car and the repairs performed were not authorized.
After the trial court set the matter for a hearing, the Morgungenkos filed a complaint alleging claims of detinue and conversion. On July 9, 2008, the trial court entered an order finding the vehicle to be an "abandoned vehicle" as the term is used in the statute and ordering that it be sold at public auction. In that order, the trial court also stated that it made no determination as to whether the storage fees claimed were reasonable. The Morgungenkos filed a notice of appeal.
The court noted the general rule that a final judgment is one which leaves nothing to be done in the trial court. In this case, however, the Morgungenkos, in addition to disputing Dwayne's right to sell the vehicle as an abandoned vehicle, asserted claims of detinue and conversion. The trial court ordered that those claims be tried separately from the claim protesting the sale of the vehicle under the Act and even used the word "sever." At no point, however, were the claims truly severed so as to create separate and independent actions. Indeed, it would not have been appropriate to do so given the nature of the claims.
Accordingly, the order appealed from was not final--more was left to be done in the trial court--and the appeal was dismissed.
