Crutcher Opinion Reviews Plethora of Procedural Rules
In Crutcher v. Williams, No. 1050893 (Ala. March 14, 2008), the Alabama Supreme Court remanded a case because the judgment from which the appeal was taken was not final. The Court asked the trial court, within fourteen days, either to certify the primary judgment as final under Rule 54(b) or to enter a judgment on the cross-claim in the case. In reaching its decision, the Court reviewed many tenets of procedural law.
The Crutcher opinion arises out of a medical malpractice case. The plaintiff sued a physician and the hospital that employed the physician. The hospital filed a cross-claim against the physician. As the trial against the defendants neared completion, the trial court told the jurors that the cross-claim was part of the case, but instructed the jurors not to concern themselves with the cross-claim in the liability phase of the trial. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the trial court asked the jurors whether their negligence verdict against the hospital was based on an agency theory or whether the verdict reflected a finding of combined negligence of the hospital and the physician. Thy jurors replied that the physician was acting as an agent or employee of the hospital, but that the verdict against the hospital was, “[d]ue to [its] own acts of negligence combined with acts of negligence” of the physician.
The trial court entered a judgment on the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, but the judgment did not address the cross-claim. On appeal, the physician stated that he was not certain that the trial court judgment was final. The plaintiff asserted that the judgment was final because the parties stipulated that the cross-claim would not survive if the jury found negligence on the hospital’s part, independent of the physician. Alternatively, the plaintiff asked the Court to remand the case to the trial court to allow the trial court to correct the order pursuant to ARCP 60(a).
The Supreme Court noted that it is not bound by the parties’ statements regarding jurisdiction and that it is obligated to dismiss an appeal ex mero motu if the Court lacks jurisdiction over an appeal. “The burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction falls on the party invoking that jurisdiction.”
The Court, citing ARAP 28(g), rejected the plaintiff’s contention that the judgment was final by virtue of the parties’ stipulation because the plaintiff provided no record cite in support of the purported stipulation; the Court “will not consider evidence or stipulations that are outside of the record.” Furthermore, the plaintiff “cited no legal authority to support her theory that a claim terminates upon the happening of an event that causes the claim to be moot, rather than upon the entry of an order disposing of the claim.” Because the plaintiff provided no support from the record or from legal authority in support of her arguments, the Court refused to consider them.
The Court concluded that the trial court order was not a final judgment because it did not dispose of all of the claims against all of the parties in the action. The Court also rejected the plaintiff’s request that the Court order the trial court to correct the judgment. The Court observed that the plaintiff failed to cite authority for the proposition that Rule 60(a) is a vehicle for curing a jurisdictional defect. The Court also noted that Rule 60(a) pertains to clerical errors, not to the more “substantial” errors in the case at bar.
