Consequences of Party's Failure to Cite Legal Authority
Walden v. Hutchinson, No. 1060516, released by the Alabama Supreme Court on November 9, reminds us of the consequences of failing to cite legal authority in appellate briefs.
In Walden, the appellant appealed the trial court’s determination that a particular “Schedule A” was legally sufficient to transfer a quitclaim mortgage to a trust. She argued that Schedule A lacked any legal description of the real property it purported to convey and that it failed to “comply with various other statutory requirements of a conveyance.” She failed, however, to cite any legal authority to support that assertion, merely referencing an inapposite statute. The court reiterated the consequences of failing to support an argument with legal authority, stating that Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P., requires that arguments in an appellant’s brief contain citations to the cases, statutes, and other authorities. The court further indicated that effect of noncompliance with this rule is well-established: where no legal authority is cited or argued, the effect is the same as if no argument had been made. To the extent the trial court held that Schedule A was sufficient, then, the court affirmed that holding.
Your comments that this case "reminds us of the consequences of failing to cite legal authority in appellate briefs" is, with respect, misleading. I was the lawyer in that case, and my perspective is different than yours. I did NOT fail to cite supporting legal authority; indeed, I cited a statute. The supremes said the statute I cited was "inapposite", which is not at all true and which I have argued in my motion for rehearing. In fact, I cited a statute that was directly on point -- in my opinion at least. The first sentence of the statue was not applicable, but the second sentence of the statute was. Moreover, I pointed out on rehearing that the citation of a statute carries with it (by implication) the cases cited in support of the statute, and I also pointed out that those cases supported the point I was attempting to make. That is to say, those cases explained or amplified the statute, and, thus, established that the statute was indeed relevant authority in support of the issue under discussion. Be that as it may, the larger and more profound issue is the court's obvious indifference to its own policy , which is, of course, stated in Rule 1. Rule 1 has been persistently diluted in the last 30 years, and more particularly in the last 10 years. Fairness and justice have taken a back seat to procedural technicalities, and the technicalities are patently illogical. Cases are often not being decided on their merits, but on trivialities. (Read Cobb's dissenting opinion in Rigsby v. Shoney's). In Walden v. Hutchinson one of the court's excuses for affirming the summary judgment was that I did not explain a particular point. Well, if oral argument had been granted I would have explained. And I could and would have cited other authority. Etc. Etc. Etc.