Remand to Juvenile Court Not A Final Judgment: Supported Neither Appeal Nor Mandamus
By remanding a custody dispute to juvenile court, the circuit court did not enter a final judgment that would support an appeal. The juvenile court's assertion of jurisdiction, which did not adjudicate custody, moreover would not justify a writ of mandamus. E.E.K. v. Jefferson County Dept. of Human Resources, No. 2050733 (Ala. Civ. App. June 29, 2007).
The juvenile court entered an order asserting "temporary emergency jurisdiction" over a custody dispute. The order directed a study of the children’s home but did not adjudicate custody. The juvenile court wrote that either party could appeal the decision to the Court of Civil Appeals.
The mother appealed to the circuit court. That court ruled that the temporary jurisdiction order was nonfinal, and remanded the case to juvenile court. The mother then sought review in the Court of Civil Appeals.
The Court of Civil Appeals first determined that it lacked appellate jurisdiction. The court wrote: “A ruling by a circuit court that it does not have jurisdiction to conduct a trial de novo remanding the case to the juvenile court is not a final judgment . . . .”
The Court of Civil Appeals then discretionarily treated the appeal from an interlocutory order as a petition for a writ of mandamus. Under a mandamus analysis, though, the mother failed to show she had a “clear legal right to appeal to the circuit court.” Rule 28 of the Alabama Rules of Juvenile Procedure authorizes appeals from “final judgment[s]” of the juvenile court. The order in question only asserted the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over the case; it “did not establish custody [of the children] in either party.” It therefore was not final. This conclusion was not affected by the juvenile court’s statement that the parties could appeal its decision. “[W]hether a judgment is final, and thus appealable, does not depend on the trial court’s characterization of the order; rather, it depends on whether the judgment sufficiently ascertains and declares the rights of the parties.” The order in question did not do so. The Court of Civil Appeals thus denied the petition.
(A second appeal was dismissed as moot in this consolidated disposition. That other case, in this author’s view, reflected no appellate principle of sufficient general interest to warrant summarizing here.)
The mother appealed to the circuit court. That court ruled that the temporary jurisdiction order was nonfinal, and remanded the case to juvenile court. The mother then sought review in the Court of Civil Appeals.
The Court of Civil Appeals first determined that it lacked appellate jurisdiction. The court wrote: “A ruling by a circuit court that it does not have jurisdiction to conduct a trial de novo remanding the case to the juvenile court is not a final judgment . . . .”
The Court of Civil Appeals then discretionarily treated the appeal from an interlocutory order as a petition for a writ of mandamus. Under a mandamus analysis, though, the mother failed to show she had a “clear legal right to appeal to the circuit court.” Rule 28 of the Alabama Rules of Juvenile Procedure authorizes appeals from “final judgment[s]” of the juvenile court. The order in question only asserted the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over the case; it “did not establish custody [of the children] in either party.” It therefore was not final. This conclusion was not affected by the juvenile court’s statement that the parties could appeal its decision. “[W]hether a judgment is final, and thus appealable, does not depend on the trial court’s characterization of the order; rather, it depends on whether the judgment sufficiently ascertains and declares the rights of the parties.” The order in question did not do so. The Court of Civil Appeals thus denied the petition.
(A second appeal was dismissed as moot in this consolidated disposition. That other case, in this author’s view, reflected no appellate principle of sufficient general interest to warrant summarizing here.)
