Posted on May 13, 2008 by Craig N. Rosler

Appeals From Non-Final and Void Judgments Lead to Triple Dismissal -- Appeals From Even Non-Final Judgments Divest Trial Court of Jurisdiction

One appellant saw three appeals dismissed in a single decision from the Court of Civil Appeals. Busby v. Lewis, Nos. 2060998, 2060999, 2070151 (Ala. Civ. App. May 9, 2008). Two appeals were from nonfinal judgments that had left claims pending against other parties; while a third was from a void judgment entered after the first appeals were lodged — and thus after the trial court had lost jurisdiction of the case.

This dispute grew out of a real-property sale. When he received less in the sale than he thought he had rightfully purchased, the buyer sued his agent, the husband and wife who sold him the property, their agent, and the title insurance company. The circuit court entered summary judgment for the husband and wife and, filing one notice of appeal for each summary judgment, the buyer appealed.

While these appeals were pending, the circuit court entered a summary judgment against the buyer in favor of the remaining parties. This last judgment resolved all remaining claims against all remaining parties. The buyer filed a third appeal from this judgment.

The Court of Civil Appeals dismissed all three appeals. The first two, it reasoned, were from nonfinal judgments. “It is a well established rule,” the appellate court wrote, “that, with limited exceptions, an appeal will lie only from a final judgment . . . .” “A final judgment is one that completely adjudicates all matters in controversy between all the parties.” The summary judgment in favor of the husband and wife had left pending claims against the agents and the title insurance company. It therefore was not “final” and would not support an appeal.

The third appeal, for its part, was from a void judgment. Once the buyer appealed the first two judgments, the circuit court lost jurisdiction over the case. “Although the [first] two notices of appeal . . . were premature,” in that they were from non-final judgments, “they nonetheless divested the trial court of jurisdiction.” The judgment “purporting to dispose” of the remaining claims after the buyer had filed his first two appeals was a “nullity” and would “not support an appeal.”

All three appeals were consequently dismissed.
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Posted on April 16, 2008 by Craig N. Rosler

Voluntary Dismissal "Effective Automatically," Leaves Nothing to Appeal

A voluntary dismissal left a would-be intervener with nothing to appeal from. Its motion to intervene was denied in action that was already “defunct”; and the appeal from that denial was consequently dismissed. Gallagher Basset Services, Inc. v. Phillips, No. 1070416 (Ala. Apr. 11, 2008).

The plaintiff was injured when she fell from a ladder while working. She collected workers’ compensation benefits, and eventually sued the treating physician for malpractice. Her employer, and its compensation carrier, both moved to intervene. Their motion was denied and the carrier appealed.

The Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed the appeal. The day before the employer and carrier moved to intervene, the plaintiff and physician had reached a settlement, and under Rule 41(a)(1), stipulated to a voluntary dismissal. The state’s high court explained that this dismissal was effective immediately and left nothing from which to appeal. “[T]here is no right of appeal,” the court wrote, “from the denial of a motion to intervene in a defunct action.” The court continued:

Rule 41(a)(1) affords the trial court no discretion. The entry of . . . a stipulation of dismissal is effective automatically and does not require judicial approval. The effect of a voluntary dismissal . . . is to render the proceedings a nullity and leave the parties as if the action had never been brought. . . .

Thus, . . . when [the carrier] filed its motion to intervene, there was no case in which [it] could intervene. The trial court thus lacked authority over [the carrier’s] motion, either to grant or deny it. It follows that its order denying [that] motion is void. Because a void order or judgment will not support an appeal, this appeal must be dismissed.

(Citations omitted) (emphases in Gallagher Basset).
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Posted on June 19, 2007 by Craig N. Rosler

Alabama Court of Civil Appeals Allows Appeal of Order Granting Rule 60(b) Motion

    In Lanier Worldwide, Inc. v. Crum [slip op.], the Alabama Supreme Court allowed an appeal of the trial court’s order granting a Rule 60(b) motion. In this case, released June 15, 2007, Lanier sought to enforce a Georgia judgment directing Crum to pay Lanier $17,045.66 awarded in arbitration. Lanier submitted a certified copy of the judgment, along with an affidavit of one of its attorneys who testified that the judgment of the Georgia court was valid, enforceable, and unsatisfied. In response, Crum filed a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure attacking the judgment of the Georgia court on the basis of personal jurisdiction. Following a hearing, the trial court refused to enforce the Georgia judgment, thereby effectively granting Crum’s Rule 60(b) motion.

    In determining whether it had appellate jurisdiction, the court noted the general proposition that an order granting a Rule 60(b) motion is considered interlocutory and therefore not appealable. However, the trial court’s order at issue amounted to a conclusion that the judgment of the Georgia court was void for lack of jurisdiction and no further proceedings were contemplated with respect to enforcement of the Georgia court’s judgment in the Alabama Court. Under these circumstances, orders granting Rule 60(b) relief may be appealable.

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